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This issue paper presents a discussion and a menu of alternatives for the 
members of the Governor’s Education Reform Study Commission (GERSC) 2000 to 
consider regarding school flexibility and accountability.  HB 1187, passed by the 
Georgia General Assembly last year and signed into law by Governor Barnes, set up 
a state accountability system for public education in Georgia.  For the first time in 
Georgia history, this accountability system is based on the end product of 
education—student learning.  For both schools and educators, the law provides 
several rewards for good performance and interventions for persistently low 
performance—performance defined in terms of student learning of a high quality 
curriculum.  Within an accountability system, the purpose of rewards and 
interventions is to motivate school personnel and the wider community to offer each 
child the best education possible.  Rewards and interventions give educators an 
incentive to work together to find and implement educational strategies that best 
serve their unique student populations.   Rewards recognize educators for their 
success, and interventions rescue children from low quality schooling.  The purpose 
of a system of rewards and interventions is not to be punitive; the purpose is to 
increase the quality of education offered to each child. 
Without a significant degree of control over the means for education 
improvement, such as budgets, personnel, and curriculum, schools and educators 
cannot ultimately be held accountable for achieving the assigned end of improving 
and achieving a high level of student learning.  Suppose the state were to give a 
school, for example, student learning targets and a prescription for how to achieve 
those targets.  If the school obediently implemented the state’s prescription and the 
level of student learning was low and was not improving, then this failure is the 
state’s fault—not the school’s.  This school could be held accountable for properly 
implementing the state’s prescription; the school cannot be held accountable for 
student learning.   
One approach to accountability is to have the state and local education 
authorities articulate the desired standards for student achievement and hold schools 
and educators accountable for properly implementing a centrally prescribed education 
program.  A different approach is to have state and local education authorities 




articulate the desired standards for student achievement and hold schools and 
educators accountable, through rewards and interventions, for meeting or failing to 
meet the standards.  If Georgia chooses the second path, the path of accountability 
for student learning and flexibility on “how to” meet the goals, parents and 
educators could be encouraged and empowered to produce their own road maps for 
success, and each would be held accountable for the results of their initiative.   
This issue paper covers two subjects: 
- A discussion of alternative flexibility models within a results-based 
accountability system. 
- Alternatives for providing incentives for high student achievement, incentives not 
contained in HB 1187. 





A.  Flexibility Within An Accountability System 
The purpose of flexibility within a results-based accountability system is to 
allow educators and schools to create their own roadmaps for educational success 
given their unique student populations, circumstances, and personnel.  Some believe 
that the level of flexibility that is desirable under a results-based accountability 
system is much larger than that which is desirable under the old way of doing 
things—accountability based on inputs, process, and implementation.  They feel that 
within a results-based accountability system educators and schools have strong 
incentives to do whatever it takes to achieve the specified student learning goals. 
Results-based accountability is a different world than the previous type of 
input/process/implementation accountability. This section presents the reasons why 
some feel that increased flexibility is desirable, and possibly necessary, within a 
results-based accountability system.  We discuss these reasons, not to advocate them, 
but to provoke a discussion over the appropriate levels and types of flexibility that is 
desirable in this new era of educational accountability in Georgia. 
In this new era of accountability based on student learning (results), flexibility 
could be granted in three ways: 
- As a feasible alternative, in a world of accountability based on results, to 
empower all local principals and teachers find their own roadmaps for success 
given their unique student populations, circumstances, and personnel.    
- As a reward to a school or system for high levels and/or improvement in student 
learning.  
- As an opportunity to low performing schools to improve. 
In a world without results-based accountability in many education rules and 
regulations are necessary.  The goal of rules and regulations is to elicit high school 
performance, students learning beyond expectations.  Some educators believe that 
many of the current laws and rules, through unintended consequences, hinder them 
from offering the best possible education to each child.  However, eliminating such 
rules is not necessarily warranted—Schools have little incentive to act in the best 
interest of children without the rules if they are not held accountable for outcomes—it 




is human nature.  For example, if a principal is held accountable only for 
implementing a central authority’s prescriptive regulations by merely “dotting all i’s 
and crossing all t’s” what is to stop him or her from hiring a relative who may not be 
competent as a teacher?  Nothing, unless there are certification rules and other 
regulations to drastically mitigate the chance of this occurring (Of course, no set of 
rules can completely eliminate all corruption).   
If principals and schools are held accountable for meeting the goals for student 
learning, the desired ends of education, there is a case for eliminating some portion of 
the current laws, rules, and regulations governing schools: Schools and educators 
truly held accountable for student learning (results) have a strong incentive to do 
whatever it takes to meet the specified goals for student learning.  In a well-
functioning accountability system, failure to meet those goals will result in 
interventions to rescue the children from low performing schools; exceeding the goals 
will result in rewards. 
Doing whatever it takes may require that individual schools do things differently 
than prescribed under current laws and regulations.  Advocates for flexibility suggest 
that in the previous era of no accountability for results those laws and regulations 
were absolutely necessary; in the era of accountability, many may be impediments to 
some school improvements. 
Interestingly, there are opportunities for obtaining flexibility available to 
local schools under current laws and regulations, and, by and large, local 
educators are not taking advantage of them.  These opportunities include the 
waiver process, charter school conversions, and demonstration schools.  Although 
there are many waiver petitions, the vast majority of them are for the same two or 
three things.  Charter school conversion opportunities have been available since 1993, 
and there have been less than 30 conversions (out of 1,887 schools).  The similar 
demonstration school process has been available since the QBE law was enacted, and, 
to our knowledge, there has been only one application.  As stated previously, Georgia 
is in a new era of results-based accountability, and this new era will likely result in a 
large increase in the interest of local educators in utilizing the existing flexibility to 
do things in different ways—because they are now held accountable for student 
learning.  The question facing Georgia today is whether the current level of flexibility 




is enough, or is it desirable to give more flexibility?  Who should be able to receive 
any increase in flexibility? 
1.  Guiding Principles of Flexibility 
We offer three guiding principles for any central authority deciding whether to 
grant flexibility to local schools, systems, and educators: 
- Keep your eyes on the prize.  The purpose of flexibility is to allow educators to 
better organize their systems, schools, and personnel in order to increase student 
learning. 
-  Trust but verify.  Flexibility should only be granted in exchange for 
accountability, a promise that student learning will increase beyond normal 
expectations.  Failure to meet the terms of the promise should result in loss of 
flexibility.  If under the flexibility, student learning in the school significantly 
regresses, the school should receive help, which would leave the school with less 
flexibility than it had initially. 
- Remove existing barriers to creativity that strives for excellence.  Any system or 
school that wants to improve should be allowed to try, in exchange for 
accountability for results. 
2.  Categories of Flexibility 
State laws and/or State Department of Education regulations can be repealed to 
provide local educators with flexibility over four broad areas: 
- Reporting Requirements 
- Financial Resources 
- Human Resources 
- Curriculum. 
Reporting Requirements 
Local educators, in both districts and schools, must complete a lot of reports for 
both the state and federal governments. This paperwork is typically in the form of 
reports that must be completed before and after the receipt of funds from federal and 
state education programs.  The pre-funding reports are typically plans on how the 
particular  pot of  money  would be  spent,  and  the  post-funding  reports  tend  to be 




assessments of how successful the particular program was.  Under Georgia’s new 
results-based accountability system, there may be some redundant reporting given the 
overall results-based assessments that will be completed by the Office of Education 
Accountability.  In addition, many view assessing education outcomes as more 
important than education processes, especially under the assessments and 
performance measurements for student learning that the state will conduct under its 
new results-based accountability system.    
Even with the state’s consolidated grant applications and streamlining, filling out 
paperwork is arduous for local schools and systems, especially for smaller school 
systems.  One associate superintendent of a small school district who we spoke with 
said that he spends about 30% of his time on filling out reports—time that he feels 
could be better spent on instructional and programmatic improvements.   
We list two alternative ways for the state to reduce reporting requirements on 
local educators 
- Have the state Department of Education (DOE) satisfy much of the reporting 
requirements imposed by the federal government; the Georgia DOE has the 
information necessary to fill out much of this paperwork.  If the state DOE 
assumed this reporting burden, local educators—the educators closest to the 
students—would have more time to focus on teaching and learning. 
- Give local schools systems and schools more flexibility over financial resources.  
Having flexibility over financial resources would allow local educators to spend 
less time reporting (to the state) how each dollar is spent.  This type of flexibility 
is described in the next section.             
Financial Resources 
Public school systems receive monies from the state through foundation grants 
and categorical grants.  Individual public schools, in turn, receive monies from school 
systems.  Superintendents and principals could be empowered to spend more state 
monies in the ways they deem most appropriate to best educate their unique student 
populations.  In addition, any state regulations, explicit or implicit, of local money 
could be repealed as well.  The purpose of flexibility over financial resources is to 
empower those closest to the children to try new things, to augment existing 
programs that are working, and reduce or eliminate programs that are not working for 




their students (such programs may work in other places for idiosyncratic reasons).  A 
by-product of this flexibility would be to reduce paperwork for system and school 
administrators and teachers, which would allow them to spend more time focusing on 
doing whatever it takes to improve their schools. 
A good way to demonstrate flexibility over financial resources is through examples: 
Some school districts have directors of technology.  These directors must fill 
out a lot of paperwork on how state technology monies are spent.  Any time 
these directors spend filling out paperwork is time not spent training teachers 
how to use the technology.   
Individual school districts get English to Speakers of Other Languages 
(ESOL) dollars from the state.  Some small school districts have only a small 
number of ESOL students, so the state money they receive for the ESOL 
program does not cover a full teacher’s salary.  School districts that have such 
scale issues must use locally generated funds or other state funds for 
personnel to pay the balance of an ESOL teacher’s salary.  In addition, the 
district would have to use local funds for ESOL materials.  Authority to use 
other state funds to purchase ESOL materials would free up the local money 
for other programs that local educators deem important for their particular 
student populations.   
Where would “other state funds” come from?  Wouldn’t those “other state 
funds” be better spent on the programs for which they were earmarked by the state?  
Perhaps, but consider an additional scenario.  School systems receive money from the 
state based on the system’s needs (needs as determined by the state, and these needs 
tend to be drive by overall FTE counts and FTE counts for various student sub-
groups) that are calculated to the hundredth decimal place.  For example, a system 
may receive state funding for 2.35 guidance counselors.  Per state regulations, the 
system that received funding for 2.35 guidance counselors must hire two guidance 
counselors.  The remaining 35% of a guidance counselor must be spent on guidance 
counselors or direct teaching personnel, or else the money reverts back to the state.  
That is, the local system must use all that state money for guidance counselors or 
direct teaching personnel or lose it.  Allowing local schools and systems to use the 
guidance counselor money for guidance counselors OR direct teaching personnel is 
an example of flexibility over resources available under current laws and regulations.  




However, some suggest that there should be increased flexibility over that state 
money.  Suppose local educators believe that because of their superior guidance 
counselors or students (of for any idiosyncratic reason) that the money that was 
originally intended to hire 35% of a guidance counselor does not need to be spent on 
guidance counseling or direct teaching personnel.  Suppose the school system would 
rather use those state funds for a competing, albeit worthy, program.  Suppose the 
school system wants to use those funds for ESOL materials.  The money may be 
spent on hiring a third guidance counselor or part of a teacher, and this requirement 
may not lead to the highest and best use of those funds. 
Alternatives to give local educators flexibility over financial resources include, 
- Having fewer state programs and give the monies formerly earmarked for 
programs to local schools on an FTE basis. 
- Allow local educators to spend monies earmarked for less than 50% of a position 
in any ways they deem necessary. 
Human Resources 
Regarding what types of individuals may be hired for some tasks and how much 
individuals are paid, systems and individual schools are bound by three major state 
laws: teacher certification, “fair dismissal” (tenure), and the salary schedule.   
The purpose of certification is to ensure that only individuals of a sufficient 
competency are permitted to be teachers.  Under certification laws and regulations, 
sufficient competency of potential teachers is determined centrally, not by local 
systems and schools.  This is  in contrast to higher education and private K-12 
education where potential teachers are evaluated by individual schools and 
departments within schools.  An unintended consequence of certification 
requirements is that some prospective teachers feel that they face too large of a 
barrier to offering their services to schools.  How many prospective educators are 
deterred is unknown. 
Individual schools and systems could be granted flexibility over who they permit 
to teach.  The elimination of certification requirements, including alternative 
certification requirements, would open the doors to teaching to individuals who are 
not willing to go through the process of obtaining certification.  For example, 
programs such as Teach for America carefully screen recent college graduates and 




place them as teachers in schools.  These new college graduates typically did not 
study education, and many of them wish to teach for only a short period of time.  
Local systems and schools could be empowered to decide for themselves if they wish 
to screen new college graduates, older folks looking for second careers, or others who 
are not certified to see if any or many of them would make good teachers.  In 
addition, the State of Georgia could recruit and screen exceptional college graduates 
who did not study education as undergraduates and any others interested and market 
these potential teachers to local systems and schools.  The state could target these 
prospective teachers to subjects and geographical areas of the state with teacher 
shortages. 
Another process for granting flexibility over personnel is easing requirements for 
alternative certification—making it easier for individuals deemed competent teachers 
by principals and/or a central authority to enter the teaching profession.   
Last year’s decision to amend Georgia’s “fair dismissal” (tenure) law created a 
large controversy—many supported the change, many felt that the changes were not 
dramatic enough, and many wanted no changes at all.  Flexibility over “fair 
dismissal” could be granted to local schools or school systems—individual school 
systems or schools could be granted the authority to design their own “fair dismissal” 
policies.  Proponents of flexibility suggest that, held accountable for results, 
individual systems and schools now have the incentive to create fair dismissal 
policies that allow them to maximize student learning.   
The state has a minimum salary schedule for teachers that is based on years of 
service and training.  Elimination of a state-mandated salary schedule for teachers 
would allow individual schools or systems to decide whether they want to pay less to 
some teachers so that they may pay more to teachers they deem as important 
contributors to the overall mission of the school.  Used judiciously, such policies 
could help schools retain good teachers, and provide incentives for bad teachers to 
find something else to do.  An additional form of flexibility would be to allow for 
schools to lure teachers by offering to start them at a higher step on the schedule than 
their years of service and training would dictate.  This flexibility would allow schools 
to pay more to better teachers, which may enhance retention of these superior 
teachers.     




HB 1187 imposed smaller class sizes on local systems and schools.  Prior to HB 
1187, local systems were using state monies earmarked to make class sizes smaller 
on other things they deemed more important for teaching and learning; local 
educators had flexibility over use of those monies, and this flexibility was taken 
away.  Prior to the results-based accountability begun by HB 1187, such class size 
restrictions may have been necessary to ensure that the state money was spent wisely.  
However, under the incentives in the new results-based accountability, can we trust 
local educators to spend that money wisely?  Are smaller classes always the best use 
of those funds? 
Curriculum 
In the new standardized testing in Georgia, students will take exams designed to 
test Georgia’s Quality Core Curriculum (QCC).  The QCC is designed to be the 
minimum amount that students should learn in the various grade levels and subjects.  
Local educators could remain free to augment the QCC in new and creative ways.  
B.  Who Gets Flexibility? 
Differing degrees of flexibility may be granted to the following groups of 
schools: 
- All schools 
- Schools who demonstrate a high level of performance  
- Schools who demonstrate a low level of performance.   
Under the new results-based accountability system, Georgia may wish to grant all 
schools a larger degree of flexibility than they now have.  As stated previously, the 
purpose of this flexibility is to empower local districts, schools, and educators to 
create their own roadmaps for success.  Advocates of flexibility suggest that an 
increase in flexibility is only possible because of the new era of results-based 
accountability in Georgia. 




Texas, for example, dramatically reduced the regulations that the Texas 
Education Agency imposed on local systems and schools.  After the passage of their 
accountability law in 1993, the Texas House and Senate Education Committees met 
jointly to eliminate all state laws and policies that addressed “how” local educators 
should provide schooling to children.  At that time, the chairs of each committee were 
from different political parties, and we have been told that the “scrubbing” of their 
state laws and policies went very well and was bipartisan.  The flexibility law that 
subsequently passed stated that local systems had to abide by the accountability code 
and the funding code.  Interestingly, the law also contained specific language to 
prevent the Texas Education Agency (Texas’ equivalent of Georgia’s state DOE) 
from making any policies that did not pertain to the accountability or funding 
portions of the Texas state code.  The relationship between the state and local school 
systems in Texas is one of “if it is not in the accountability or funding code, then you 
can do it.  No questions asked.”  Examples of regulations that were eliminated in 
Texas include: the length of the school day and year, seat time for specific subjects, 
and the minimum required number of library books per pupil.  
At this time, we are unsure about how much flexibility local educators have over 
financial resources they receive from the state.  We were told that Texas’ school 
finance system had been recently overhauled due to equity litigation, and the 
legislature did not want to tinker with finances given the recent litigation and big 
changes in funding policies.  Texas has not yet been able to document to what extent 
the increase in flexibility led to its recent increases in student achievement. (We 
obtained all information about Texas from a recent phone interview with Dr. Criss 
Cloudt, Associate Commissioner, Office of Policy, Planning, and Research, Texas 
Education Agency.  Dr. Cloudt made a presentation to GERSC 1999.)         
Schools who demonstrate a high level of performance and/or improvement have 
demonstrated that they have “what it takes” to manage a school under the current 
rules and regulations.  Such successful leadership could be entrusted with even 
greater flexibility, to see if they could increase school performance even higher.  
However, some suggest that local educators are unprepared for any large increase in 
authority and would require training.  Others say “why rock the boat” if the school is 
already high performing.  Advocates of flexibility want to “rock the boat” because 
they believe that added flexibility will allow high achieving schools to do even better.  




Texas provides additional flexibility to schools that receive an “exemplary” rating 
from the state.      
Schools whose students are persistently low performing may credibly suggest 
that state laws and regulations are due part of the blame for this low performance.  
Some suggest that these schools should be given added flexibility, above what is 
given to other schools, in order to see if they can improve.  Others argue that giving 
these schools added flexibility would reward failure.      
C.  What Are The Vehicle(s) For Granting Flexibility? 
Alternative vehicles for granting flexibility include:  
1) An entity that, within the next two years, analyzes each and every state rule 
and regulation and decides which ones are not needed (and are able to be 
abolished without changing state laws) in this new era of accountability.  This 
entity would be analogous to Vice-President Gore’s National Performance 
Review that was created in 1993.  This new entity, or a piece of an existing 
entity, could be charged with analyzing each and every state regulation on 
local systems and schools.  Regulations deemed to be impediments to 
teaching and learning would be eliminated by the entity. 
2) The General Assembly and Governor who could analyze each and every state 
law and decide which are no longer needed in this new era of results-based 
accountability.  Only the General Assembly and Governor can change 
existing state laws.  The General Assembly could devote some portion of its 
next term to reviewing existing state laws regarding education and deciding 
which laws are antiquated given the new era of results-based accountability.  
Perhaps a one-time bipartisan committee could be formed to begin the task.  
This vehicle for granting flexibility was used in Texas. 
3) A permanent entity that has the sole responsibility of hearing petitions from 
individual schools and decides whether to grant a large degree of autonomy to 
individual schools in exchange for a promise of increased student learning 
beyond normal expectations.  This is similar to the waiver process; the 
difference is that flexibility will be granted for a whole range of items at one 
time, in exchange for tangible, measurable promises of increased student 
learning.  A permanent new entity, or piece of an existing entity, whose sole 




mission is to hear petitions from local systems and schools for large degrees 
of flexibility in exchange for accountability would provide a permanent 
vehicle for enhancing flexibility and accountability.  Creating an entity that 
has hearing these petitions as its sole mission would expedite the waiver 
process, and one of its goals would be to become less arduous than the current 
waiver process.  Agreements between this entity and individual schools or 
systems would be akin to performance contracts.  Failure by the local 
educators to live up to the increases in student learning specified in the 
agreement could result in the loss of the flexibility.  Any significant 
regression in student learning after receiving the new flexibility could result 
in a state-mandated intervention, which would mean less local autonomy than 
was initially present.    
Under these alternative vehicles for increasing flexibility, persistently low 
performing schools would receive increased flexibility from any blanket elimination 
of regulations given to all schools, and these schools would have the opportunity to 
petition the permanent “flexibility” entity to receive even greater flexibility, in 
exchange for increased accountability. 
D.  What Flexibility Ought To Be Granted? 
This question is too important to be answered in one part of one issue paper.  
Nevertheless, an important discussion of this question is necessary, and this issue 
paper seeks to start that discussion.  Some advocates of increased flexibility believe 
that failure to judiciously increase flexibility may lead to a gradual erosion of the 
accountability measures passed in HB 1187.  If local educators who have little or no 
flexibility to improve schools are blamed for any school failures, then such a situation 
is not likely to be stable politically.  Those wrongly blamed will make arguments that 
they are held accountable for things beyond their control, and the end result could be 
the erosion of accountability based on student learning.   
Many suggest that schools that are doing a great job, properly measured, can be 
rewarded greater degrees of autonomy than other schools—to see if these schools can 
do an even better job.   




One level of flexibility is the current level of regulation applied to private 
schools.  A less extreme level of flexibility is the flexibility requested or the 
flexibility actually granted to “traditional” charter schools in Georgia and other states. 
Prior to the 1998 Charter School law, twenty-seven Georgia public schools converted 
to charter school status. These schools are different than traditional charter schools in 
that they maintained most of their previous organizational structure and curricular 
goals, but asked to be exempt from such things as report cards regulations, how they 
handled certain categorical funds, and when they tested their students. By traditional, 
we mean charter schools that are not neighborhood public schools; traditional charter 
schools are schools of choice.  Traditional charter schools have a stronger set of 
incentives than other public schools; they are held accountable for results—twice, by 
a central authority and by parents.  Traditional charter schools are, in theory, able to 
gain a large degree of autonomy in exchange for the possibility of a death sentence—
if  the charter school does not meet the terms of the charter, a local school district or a 
state may revoke the charter, which means the school closes.  In addition, charter 
schools are held accountable by parents who may or may not decide to enroll their 
child in the charter school.  Where traditional charter schools exist, parents have the 
option of sending their child to their neighborhood public school or the charter 
school.  Before a central authority has closed failing charter schools in other states, 
there have typically been dramatic drops in student enrollments at these schools.  
Given these strong incentives to provide a high quality education to its students, 
charter schools have the incentive to seek to free itself from any rules and regulations 
that hinder teaching and learning.  Therefore, any entity that seeks to identify any 
rules and regulations that may hinder teaching and learning should look to rules and 
regulations that charter schools seek to escape, and the rules they actually escape. 




For this issue paper, we interviewed several individuals about their experiences 
with flexibility and the flexibility given to charter schools: 
Beverly Shrenger Coordinator, GA Charter Schools, GA Dept. of Education 
Deborah McGriff Edison Schools, Inc. 
Rich O’Neill Edison Schools, Inc. 
Greg Giomelli Principal, Drew Elementary School 
Regina Merriweather Principal, Druid Hills High School 
Jeffrey Williams GA School Superintendent’s Association 
Paul Hill University of Washington, RAND Corporation 
Charter Schools And Rules And Regulations They Perceive As Impediments 
to Teaching and Learning 
According to the 1998 Charter Schools Act, charter schools are exempt from all 
“state and local rules, regulations, policies, and procedures”. In order to obtain a 
charter, however, the petitioning schools must obtain sponsorship from either the 
local district or the State Board of Education. In practice, this approval process leads 
to substantial, but not complete, freedom from state and local rules, regulations, 
policies, and procedures.  
Based on our interviews and some research, we have compiled a list of rules or 
regulations that charters typically want to opt out of: 
1) District Salary Schedule.  Many charters want the capability to pay what 
Edison Schools, Inc. refers to as “comparable and competitive” salaries. 
These salaries are made up of an hourly rate, a yearly percentage increase, 
incentives and bonuses, and stock options. It should also be noted that many 
charters want to ensure that teachers are allowed to participate in their state 
pension fund. 
2) Curriculum. Schools want the ability to develop the criteria for their own 
lesson plans. Some charters use such prescribed curriculums as Core 
Knowledge while others are totally innovative and use curriculums particular 
to that school.  For example, Edison schools prefers to use its own curriculum 
for at least 70% of class times, and the state or district can dictate the 
remaining 30%.  




3) Non-Categorical Use of Funds. Traditional charters typically receive 
complete freedom over their budget allocations at the school site. Conversion 
schools typically ask for only limited flexibility or one-time flexibility.  For 
example, conversion charter schools may ask to use some funds ear-marked 
for extra-curricular activities to buy technology. 
4) External Reporting. The type and amount of process reporting to chartering 
agencies, school boards, and the State Department of Education is often less 
than what is required of traditional public schools.  
5) Grading.  Many charter schools want to have the ability to deviate from 
traditional grading scales. Druid Hills Charter changed its grading scale so 
that the letter grade “D” was inclusive of the 60th to 69th percentile. Some 
schools want to implement a policy of no grading, checklist reports, or even 
rely strictly on portfolio’s to show students achievement. 
6) Seat Time and Scheduling. Charters have asked to be exempt from the states 
requirement of 150 hours of clock time per year. Edison Schools have a 
longer school year than most public schools, while some charters opt for 
longer school days. This coincides with the request to alter the daily schedule 
for students (i.e. block schedule) that requires different time configurations 
than most districts currently operate under.  
7) Textbooks.  Since many charters wish to fully implement their school design, 
they request the ability to choose textbooks that may or may not be approved 
by the local school board.  
8) Certification. Teacher certification has not been a large issue for many 
charters thus far, as most charters have hired primarily certified teachers. 
Charters do exercise their ability to hire non-certified teachers in hard to fill 
subjects such as math, science, and world language. Additionally, some 
charters allow teachers certified for grades k-3 to teach 4th grade.  
9) Promotion and Retention. Charters want the opportunity to choose which 
students are promoted and retained each school year. Charters feel that this 
exemption is imperative if they are going to be held accountable for each 
student’s eventual success or failure.  




10) Assessment instruments.  Some charter schools like to perform their own 
assessments, and request waivers from assessments, such as norm referenced 
testing, that are not used for accountability purposes. According to the Center 
for Education Reform, over 96% of charter schools use standardized tests. 
This indicates that charter schools are not looking to opt out of state testing 
requirements, but instead looking to supplement state accountability testing 
programs with additional testing practices.  
11) Technology. Charter schools like to use technology in a way that is consistent 
with their instructional goals. According to the U.S. Department of 
Education, 96% of charter school classrooms nationwide were equipped with 
computers. However, charters like the capability of choosing their own 
software, the amount of time each student uses a computer and the ability to 
buy computers with multi-media capabilities.  
12) Service Providers. Charter schools are typically allowed to choose what non-
educational (maintenance, janitorial, insurance, purchasing, legal, health, 
social, before/after school, transportation, athletic, etc.) services are offered 
and who will be the provider of those services. More than two thirds of 
charter schools nationally either provided the service themselves or used 
outside providers.  
Georgia charter petitions do, however, ask to opt out of rules and regulations that 
are consistent with those in other states, In fact, researchers have been able to identify 
eight broad categories of exemptions sought in most charter petitions regardless of 
state: curriculum, instruction and assessment, school organization, leadership and 
governance, staffing, parent and community involvement, scheduling, technology, 
and financing.  Regarding governance, charter schools in Georgia are required to give 
parents more authority over governance than parents on the new school councils will 
have.  





A.  Additional Incentives Through Rewards and Interventions 
HB 1187 contained several rewards for high student achievement and 
interventions to rescue children from persistently low performing schools and 
personnel.  The purpose of the rewards and interventions in the law is to provide 
parents, teachers, other educators, schools, and systems with incentives to work 
together to increase student learning beyond expectations.  This section presents a 
series of additional rewards and interventions—additional incentives to meet our 
education goals.  These alternatives are not necessarily exhaustive or mutually 
exclusive.  In addition, some of these alternatives are hybrids of what has been tried 
in other states or in Georgia, and some, because no state does an adequate job of 
holding schools accountable (see the introduction to Education Week’s Quality 
Counts ’99: Rewarding Results and Punishing Failure), have never been tried. 
A single alternative or any group of rewards and interventions does not 
constitute an accountability system.  An accountability system is a three-legged stool 
that contains goals, measurement of progress toward the goals for student learning, 
and rewards for success and interventions in the case of persistently low or decreased 
levels of student learning.  Goals and measurement are outside the scope of this issue 
paper, and we work under the presumption that the goals will be excellent and the 
measurement will be accurate.  These alternatives are based on the following ten 
characteristics of an effective rewards and interventions system.  Within a 
comprehensive accountability system, rewards and interventions should be  
1) Focused on increasing learning for all students. 
2) Designed to provide schools and school personnel with incentives to increase 
student learning of a high quality curriculum beyond expectations. 
3) Designed to develop the ability of school leaders and staff to plan for and 
achieve continued improvements towards high standards. 
4) Based on both absolute standards and improvement. 
5) Supported with adequate and sustained financial resources and personnel.   
6) Fair, consistent, equitable, and understandable to all school and system 
personnel. 




7) Implemented in a manner that allows time to improve low performance. 
8) Based on rewarding sustained exceptional performance or improvement.  
9) Making parents/caregivers more responsible for and involved in the education 
of their children. 
10)  Working to harness the resources of the community to improve student 
learning.  
With each alternative reward and intervention come potential benefits and 
potential risks.  These potential risks should be made public in order to help citizens 
and policymakers make choices and improve the design, implementation, and future 
reform of the system of rewards and interventions.   
B.  Alternative Rewards and Interventions 
1.  Rewards 
Possible school and personnel rewards for high and/or improving student 
achievement include,  
Pay for performance to individual teachers.  According to Helen Ladd, the 
problems with merit pay for individual teachers include,  
 “the lack of consensus about what makes for effective 
teaching, the associated difficulty of measuring 
meritorious performance, and, most importantly, the 
inappropriateness of using a reward system based on 
individual behavior given that gains in student 
achievement reflect not just the actions of an individual 
teacher, but also the more general environment for 
learning in the school.” (The context of this quote was 
Professor Ladd’s understanding of teachers’ arguments 
against merit pay.  See Ladd’s chapter in Holding Schools 
Accountable for details.) 




Nevertheless, merit pay may attract more and better college graduates into 
teaching if they believe that there will be a stronger link between pay and 
performance.  Some believe that the lack of merit pay presents an equity issue—
teachers who do a poor job are paid the same as successful teachers, if they have the 
same tenure and credentials. 
Giving successful schools and systems even greater flexibility over their 
resources, curriculum, and personnel—beyond any increase in flexibility 
given to all schools.  Instead of petitioning the state for single waivers, 
individual schools who have a track record of high performance could be 
given increased flexibility over a wide range of areas.  Schools that failed to 
continue high performance could lose their increased flexibility.   
This reward would be very inexpensive and may save the state money through 
reduced monitoring costs.  However, individual schools may require one-time 
technical assistance from the state on how to manage resources.  This reward and 
several alternatives for implementing flexibility in a world of results-based 
accountability are described at length in the next section.  
2.  Interventions 
Each of the following interventions may be prescribed by the state or an 
intervention team as a strategy for improving student achievement in low performing 
schools.  Possible school and personnel interventions to rescue children from low 
performing schools include,  
1) Requiring all schools to draft an improvement plan—especially low performing 
schools.  For low performing schools these improvement plans would be subject 
to approval by the state and/or local school board.   
2) Giving exemplary teachers and administrators financial incentives to serve in low 
performing schools.  To get strong, veteran teachers and administrators to serve 
in low performing schools, especially low performing schools in rural areas, 
would require financial inducements, and these inducements could be expensive.  
Higher performing schools that lose quality personnel for a period of time also 
face a cost. 




3) Requiring staff development tailored to specific needs for all staff—especially low 
performing staff.  Staff development could be in the form of additional formal 
training in pedagogy or content.  Formal training could be provided by a school 
of education, local districts, the private sector, or by RESAs.  Staff development 
can also be in the form of mentoring from successful peers from the teacher’s 
school.  If a low performing teacher completes staff development and does not 
improve, then the principal will be more able to dismiss such a persistently low 
performing teacher.   
4) Giving parents/caregivers the option to enroll their children in a charter 
school(s).  Although Georgia has a newly strengthened charter school law, 
Georgia has relatively few charter schools.  The state could make it easier for 
groups of parents and other private entities to start charter schools. 
5) Giving parents/caregivers the option to enroll their children in another public 
school.  Typically this option does not provide much of a choice for families 
because receiving schools have no requirement and little incentive to expand to 
accommodate additional children, and low performing schools tend to be 
geographically clustered. 
6) Offering scholarships that can be used to offset tuition payments at private 
schools to parents of students at continually low performing schools.  Parents of 
children in low performing schools could be given scholarships that can be used 
at private schools that they deem better for their children.  Supporters of this 
proposal see it as a safety net for children in low performing schools, while 
opponents see private school scholarships as not providing any benefits for the 
children who receive the scholarships and/or causing potential harm for the 
children who turn them down. 
7) Closing low performing schools.  Are there public school spaces nearby?  Are the 
nearby public schools substantially better for the students than the low 
performing school that was closed? 
8) State takeovers/annexation.  Although this option may be necessary in some 
cases this may require a constitutional amendment to be feasible in Georgia. 




9) State mandated reconstitution.  Although reconstitution may dramatically 
improve a low performing school or system, in other states, reconstitution 
typically means that the personnel from reconstituted schools are merely 
transferred.   
10) Opening state schools in neighborhoods of low performing schools. As 
referenced previously, the pertinent part of Article VIII, Section I, Paragraph I of 
the Constitution of the State of Georgia reads 
The provision of an adequate public education for the 
citizens shall be primary obligation of the State of 
Georgia. 
In addition, the pertinent part of Article VIII, Section V, Paragrpah VII, Section a 
reads: 
Special schools.  The General Assembly may provide 
by law for the creation of special school in such areas 
as may require them and may provide for the 
participation of local boards of education in the 
establishment of such schools under such terms and 
conditions as it may provide. … Any special schools 
shall be operated in conformity with regulations of the 
State Board of Education pursuant to provisions of 
law.  The state is authorized to expend funds for the 
support and maintenance of special schools in such 
amount and manner as may be provided by law. 
It appears that the General Assembly has the authority to provide schools in the 
neighborhoods of low performing schools if it chooses.  These schools could be 
charter schools, where the charters are approved by the state only; schools 
managed by private entities under contract to the state; or schools managed by the 
state Department of Education directly. 
11) Year round school.  Year round school could be mandated by the state or by 
individual systems or schools.   Further, there may be cases in which year round 
school may be used as an intervention for low performance.  




12) After school remedial academic programs.  The state could mandate after school 
programs for all schools, especially low performing schools.  Further, extended 
hours could be prescribed by an intervention team as an intervention for low 
performing schools.          
3.  Student Accountability 
Students can be held accountable by: 
1) Making promotion contingent on passing state curriculum-based tests, including 
high school graduation tests. This measure is currently a national trend as well.  
Research from Chicago has shown that having standards for students increases 
student achievement.  Offering remediation during the school year and summer 
school to all students who need this extra attention can offset any ill effects of 
these measures. 
2) Recognition.  The state can establish benchmarks for students and recognize those 
students who reach a high level of achievement and those students who make 
large improvements.  In addition, children who excel in a particular subject area 
should be allowed to place out of courses that will not challenge them.  Allowing 
these student who excel to place out of such classes will allow them to enroll in 
more challenging courses. 
3) Tiers for HOPE Scholarships.  HOPE scholarships provide a large incentive for 
preK-12 students to do well in school.  Under current law, HOPE scholarship 
awards are the same for all qualified students who attend a particular institution 
of higher learning.  The state could increase HOPE awards to students who 
achieve at even higher levels, for example.  One way to increase incentives 
through HOPE scholarships would be to provide a monthly living stipend for 
each student who achieves A or A- average in the core high school courses. 
4) Student support teams (SST’s).  Student support teams could design individual 
student improvement plans.  For example, all staff who know a particular student 
could be pulled together in a team to design a customized plan suited to the 
unique learning needs of the student.  Currently, Georgia has the option of using 
SST’s.       




4.  Parent Accountability 
Parents can be held accountable by: 
1) Making student report cards available via parent-teacher conferences only.  This 
provision would compel parents/caregivers to have at least some interaction with 
their child’s teacher.  For parents who cannot meet with teachers during school 
hours, teachers would have to be made available outside of school hours.  In 
some cases, teachers may have to visit parents at their homes. 
2) Making their children’s school and/or public privileges depend on good behavior 
and attendance.  Children who are unruly or chronically absent could lose 
parking privileges or any other school privilege.  Children could also lose or be 
denied a drivers’ license.  Good behavior and/or attendance would allow the child 
to reclaim the lost privilege. 
3) Citations and/or fines for neglect and/or bad attendance records of their 
children.  Citations, issued by school personnel, could be shared with the 
Department of Family and Child Services (DFACS), police, and the courts 
system.  
4) School-parent contracts.  These contracts can stipulate what is expected of the 
parent in order to maximize the child’s learning.  Having parents read and sign 
the contracts may provide increased motivation for parents.  Contracts can 
stipulate that parents who physically threaten and/or abuse school personnel will 
face limited access to school facilities.  Schools of parental choice, such as 
charter schools and private schools, have much more latitude over what can be 
expected of parents than neighborhood public schools.  
5) Give parents more authority and responsibility over their children’s education.  
This authority and responsibility could come from enhanced school choice 
through charter schools, public school choice, and/or taxpayer-funded 
scholarships to offset tuition payments to private schools.  Giving school councils 
majority parent representation would also give parents more authority and 
responsibility.  However, these alternatives must be effective to empower and 
hold parents accountable: school choice must be easy to exercise and individual 
school councils must have real power and authority.  Care must be taken to 
ensure that any increase in the authority of school councils does not duplicate 




responsibilities currently held by other entities.  Any duplication of authority 
would lead to an increase in impediments to change, via increased bureaucracy. 
5.  Community and State Accountability 
The community and the state can be held accountable by: 
1) Publicizing the level of student achievement in Georgia.  All schools, state and 
local social service agency locations, and participating private businesses could 
be given posters to display that show how Georgia’s schools rank nationally 
worldwide on the NAEP and international math and science exams.  This 
accountability is similar to private companies posting their stock prices.  This 
publicity would reinforce the notion that the entire community benefits when 
each child secures a better education. 
2) Publicizing the levels of state funding that each district and school receives.  The 
State of Georgia could define what fully funding the QBE means, and the 
percentage of that level that each school receives could be publicized.  This 
valuable information would allow citizens and policymakers to debate the merits 
of the definition of “fully-funded” and to see clearly the levels of funds made 
available to each district and school. The percentages of QBE funds made 
available could be recorded for all individual schools, including alternative 
schools.  Making this information available will allow citizens and policymakers 
to make their own judgments about whether the state is providing adequate 
resources for each student, including students with special needs. 
3) Making schools and parents more aware of available social services.  For 
example, recent news reports have suggested that many households eligible for 
food stamps do not receive them.  Low-income parents can provide higher levels 
of nutrition for their children if they receive food stamps.  Children who are better 
nourished will learn more in school. 
4) Breaking the monopoly over technical assistance and professional development.  
Allow individual schools and districts to shop for the best technical assistance 
and professional development available.  Competition among providers would 
compel the state Department of Education (DOE) and other entities in the 
community to provide the best services to local schools or districts or risk losing 
customers—and funding.  For example, individual schools could be given 




improvement funds that can be used at their own discretion.  Suppose a school 
decides that it needs more staff development.  The school could use those funds 
in a myriad of ways, including purchasing courses at a university or college 
school of education, buying formal training from private entities, RESAs, or the 
state DOE; and paying its own strong teachers to mentor lower performing and/or 
new teachers.  Truly holding schools and school personnel accountable for 
student learning will insure that these funds are spent wisely.  Allowing 
individual schools and districts to choose among providers of improvement 
teams, other technical assistance, and professional development would be a 
powerful mechanism to hold those providers accountable for increasing student 
achievement.  Providers whose services did not increase student learning would 
lose customers as schools and districts shop elsewhere for these services. 
Allowing school personnel who are themselves held accountable to “shop” for 
technical assistance and professional  development will align the incentives of 
school personnel and providers of these services.  Having the same incentive to 
increase student learning will make them work together and mitigate any 
tendency for these two groups to point fingers at each other if a school did not 
improve. 
5) Providing technical assistance to schools to support school improvement 
planning.  If the state is imposing accountability for local schools, then it can 
make the transition smooth by providing technical assistance to schools to 
support local school planning, management and other accountability efforts. 
6) Service learning.  If schools allow students to do community service projects, 
then the community must coordinate with schools to provide meaningful 
opportunities for students to improve their communities.  To hold the community 
accountable for providing these meaningful opportunities, schools should use the 
mass media to publicize the service performed by their students. 
7) State road and infrastructure money.  Localities that tolerate persistently low 
school performance could be subject to the loss of non-education state money 
such as state funding of roads and other infrastructure.  
8) Leadership definition and development.  In order to make sure that schools 
have the leaders they need to show improvement, he state could assume more 
responsibility for leadership development.     





With the passage of HB 1187, Georgia’s educational system has entered a new 
era of accountability—results-based accountability.  The state will set expectations 
for student learning and systems, schools, personnel will be rewarded for exceeding 
the standards and the state will intervene to rescue children from schools that are 
persistently falling below the standards.   
The purpose of flexibility within a results-based accountability system is to 
allow educators and schools to create their own roadmaps for educational success 
given their unique student populations, circumstances, and personnel.  Some believe 
that the level of flexibility that is desirable under a results-based accountability 
system is much larger than that which is desirable under the old way of doing 
things—accountability based on inputs, process, and implementation.  They feel that 
within a results-based accountability system educators and schools have strong 
incentives to do whatever it takes to achieve the specified student learning goals. 
Any increase in flexibility is only possible because of the new era of 
accountability.  The more that systems, schools, and personnel are rewarded for their 
successes and their students are rescued with interventions for any failures, the more 
flexibility that may be granted to local educators.  To that end, we have presented a 
long list of alternative rewards and interventions.  The purpose of rewards and 
interventions is to provide parents, teachers, other educators, schools, and systems 
with incentives to work together to increase student learning beyond expectations.   
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